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Introduction
There is a peculiar mismatch between explanations given by market analysts for observed exchange rate uctuations and the academic consensus about exchange rates.
The academic consensus, based on the seminal work of Richard A. Meese and Kenneth Rogo (1983) and subsequent literature, is that macroeconomic variables have little explanatory power for exchange rates in the short to medium run. On the other hand, market analysts often point to particular macro developments in accounting for exchange rates. For example, the large depreciation of the euro relative to the dollar subsequent to its inauguration in January 1999 was blamed on the strong growth performance of the US economy relative to the European economy. More recently the appreciation of the euro relative to the dollar has been blamed on the large U.S. current account de cit.
1 That practitioners regularly change the weight they attach to di erent macro indicators is widely reported in the nancial press. It has also been con rmed by Yin-Wong Cheung and Menzie Chinn (2001) , who surveyed US foreign exchange traders.
The varying weight that traders give to di erent macro indicators may explain why formal models of exchange rates have found so little explanatory power of macro variables. In contrast to existing models, the relationship between macro variables and the exchange rate appears to be highly unstable. Cheung et. al. (2002) nd that some models, with certain macro variables, do well in some periods but not in others.
One explanation for this parameter instability is a scapegoat story: some variable is given an 'excessive' weight during some period. The exchange rate may change for reasons that have nothing to do with observed macro fundamentals, for example due to unobserved liquidity trades. As the market rationally searches for an explanation for the observed exchange rate change, it may attribute it to some observed macro indicator. This macro indicator then becomes a natural scapegoat and in uences trading strategies. Over time di erent observed variables can be taken as scapegoats, so that the weights attributed to macro variables change.
In this paper we formalize this scapegoat story in the context of a simple rational expectations model. The model illustrates how a variable can become a scapegoat and illuminates the implications for the exchange rate. The basic mechanism behind this scapegoat story is that there is \confusion" in the market about the true source of exchange rate uctuations. This happens because investors have di erent views about the importance of various observed macro variables. We model this heterogeneity with investors receiving di erent private signals about some structural parameters.
Investors therefore do not know whether an exchange rate uctuation can be explained by unobserved fundamentals, such as liquidity trades, or by a larger than expected weight to certain observed macro fundamentals. In such an environment it is natural to blame the variables you can observe, i.e., the macro fundamentals.
Although models with investor heterogeneity are common in the nance literature, In Section 2, we show how the model is solved and how a scapegoat can emerge.
A crucial element is that investors use the exchange rate as a source of information on imperfectly known parameters. In Section 3, we examine the implications for the exchange rate and provide concluding comments in Section 4.
A Model with Heterogeneous Beliefs
Our starting point is the standard monetary model of exchange rate determination. It contains three equations. The rst is a purchasing power parity equation:
where s t is the log of the nominal exchange rate. The second is a money demand equation: m t p t = y t i t (and foreign analogue). The third is an interest arbitrage equation:
Here E t denotes the average expectation of individual investors and We assume that starting at date 2 investors have common information about future output levels and money supplies. To keep things simple we assume that E 2 (m t ) = E 2 (y t ) = 0 for t > 2 and that the foreign money supply and output level are zero at all times. Since E 1 (b t ) = 0 for t > 2, we have E 1 (s t ) = 0 for t > 2 (ruling out bubbles).
Then,
The exchange rate depends on current and expected future macro fundamentals minus a risk-premium term that depends on liquidity trade. Investors need to forecast money and output at time 2. We assume the following autoregressive structure (applying only at time 2): 
We assume that errors in the private signals average to zero across all investors. We can plug the expectation derived from (3) into (2) to get:
where~ (1+ )
. This di culty in the inference process can lead to rational confusion, which in turn can lead to attributing the wrong weight to fundamental variables.
Finding a Scapegoat
The equilibrium exchange rate can be solved with a simple signal extraction procedure.
Based on (4), we rst conjecture that the exchange rate takes the form
for some positive . The exchange rate depends linearly on the unknown persistence coe cients m and y , and therefore provides a public signal of these parameters. It is therefore optimal for individual investors to use both their private signals and the exchange rate as basis for estimating m and y . We now describe the inference process and the solution for the exchange rate in the case where y 1 = y, so that investors are only interested in estimating m . The more general case can be found in a Technical
Appendix available upon request.
From (5), investors can use an adjusted exchange rate signal that is normally distributed:
. Since the private signal is also normal, the optimal inference of m is a linear combination of the two signals. Aggregating the expectations of m over individuals, we get:
where 0 < v < 1 depends on the (endogenous) relative precision of private and
). A crucial element in the analysis is that the expectation of m depends on the value of the exchange rate. Using (5), one can substitute s 1 to obtain:
where k = Equation (7) illustrates how an observed macro variable can become a scapegoat.
Investors know that the equilibrium exchange rate takes the form (5). While they know the functional form, they do not know the persistence m and liquidity trades signal. In the case where money supply is large, so that m 1 m is large, a high exchange rate can then be explained by a large persistence coe cient. The reason is that more persistence leads to a bigger expected second period money supply when the money supply is above its mean in period 1. Now assume that the high level of the exchange rate is actually caused by liquidity trades. It then becomes rational to make money the scapegoat when the money supply is unusually large. Even if investors do not believe that the high money supply will be so persistent based on their private information, they will each believe that others have private signals indicating that money supply is persistent. The scapegoat is captured by (7), which shows that the expected persistence rises when b 1 < 0 and m 1 m > 0.
The rational confusion that leads to making money the scapegoat is market-wide.
Based on private information alone the average expectation of m is equal to m .
However, when b 1 < 0 and m 1 m > 0 investors systematically, and incorrectly, believe that m is larger than it actually is. They all believe that others must have information indicating that m is very large, even if no investor actually has such information.
Output can similarly become a scapegoat. The Technical Appendix shows that if y 1 6 = y we have E( y ) = y + e k(y 1 y)b 1 . If the exchange rate is high due to liquidity trades and output is below its mean (y 1 y < 0), investors revise upward their expectation of y and output becomes a scapegoat. The larger the deviations from the mean, the more likely it is to blame one of the macro variables.
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When a macro variable becomes a scapegoat, it has a much larger impact on the exchange rate than otherwise due to confusion with liquidity trade. In this regard an important role is played by the parameter = 1+ The impact of current money supply on the exchange rate is found by di erentiating (5): With no liquidity shocks the derivative of the exchange rate with respect to money would be only
1+
+~ m , the same as it would be under perfect foresight. A similar impact obtains if money supply is close to its normal level m. It is the interplay between the unobserved liquidity trades and the unusual size of the money supply that delivers the scapegoat e ect and its increased weight in the equilibrium exchange rate.
The derivative in (8) is not known to market participants since m is unknown.
One can compute the average expectation of (8), by using (5) to (7) (see the Technical Appendix for details). This gives
Clearly, the same reasoning applies to the perceived impact of m 1 on s 1 as to the actual impact. The reason is that m is expected to be larger than it actually is when m 1 is large and b 1 is negative.
We conclude this section with two remarks. First, it is worth noting that when the impact of money on the exchange rate is large as a result of the scapegoat e ect, the impact of liquidity trade is also magni ed. The rational confusion raises the impact of both money shocks and liquidity trades. Second, we have focused on the case where macro variables have increased weight. The opposite can also occur, for example, when the exchange rate is high due to a negative b 1 and the money supply is below normal. On average, macro variables have the correct weight because on average b 1 = 0.
However, this average weight may be small, so that observed macro variables do not consistently contribute much to observed exchange rate volatility.
Conclusion
In this short paper we have developed a simple model to illuminate some implications of information dispersion for the importance of macro variables in the equilibrium exchange rate. We have shown that when unobserved speculative trades are responsible for an exchange rate depreciation, an unusually high money supply can easily be made the scapegoat. We introduced only two macro fundamentals, money supply and output, but in reality one can have a large number of such macro indicators. When a macro fundamental becomes a scapegoat, its impact on the exchange rate can be much larger than otherwise.
While the model we adopted here is close to static in nature in order to keep things simple, future work should naturally focus on a more dynamic model with information heterogeneity of the sort described here. This can account for phenomena such as parameter instability and changing weight given by investors to di erent macro indicators. The average expectation is then:
where " 0 = ( b 1 ; 0; 0) since the aggregate signal errors are zero. Writing out (13) gives: . To get equation (8), using (5) gives:
We then get (8) by noting that To get equation (9), using (5) gives:
Taking expectations of (5) and using (6), we nd Eb 1 = v b 1 . We substitute this and E m from (7) to nd (9).
